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Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases
are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts judgment. These immediate interests
exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which eve
well settled principles of law will bend.'
-- Oliver Wendell Holmes
With tempers flaring and tensions mounting, a collision seems inevitable
between the United States and the European Union over the sale of new
biotechnology food products in European market. Maintaining a de facto
moratorium on the introduction of such products since 1998, the EU is trying
the patience of Washington amidst US damage claims of over $600 million in
lost exports resulting from the ban.' According to US Undersecretary of State
Alan Larson, "after three years .. .patience is wearing out."3 Claiming
violations of World Trade Organization rules, US agricultural industry
officials characterize the moratorium as a technical barrier to trade amongst
a growing belief in the industry that World Trade Organization adjudication
* J.D. 2002, University of Georgia; B.A. 1999, Mercer University. Doctoral studies in
European Union-United States trade law, University of Oxford (matriculating Fall 2002). The
author would like to thank Professor Thomas Schoenbaurn and Dean Gabriel Wilner for their
comments and support.
Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 See Bill Lambrecht, Europe's Concerns Over Biotech Foods Don't Seem Likely to Be
Assuaged Soon, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2001, at A8, available at 2001 WL
4492558.
3 Paul Geitner, EU, US at Odds Over Biotech Food, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 12, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 31685188.
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may be the only answer.4 Despite appeals for "urgent" action and increasing
pressure by the Bush Administration on the European Commission to approve
imports of crops manufactured with genetically-modified organisms (GMOs),
the European Union seems resolute and impassable.5 Though the threat of
litigation remains an ever increasing likelihood, EU officials are claiming that
it will likely be at least two years before the moratorium can be lifted.6
At a time of increased concerns regarding the US-EU alliance and the $500
billion annual trade relationship,7 officials from both sides are working
diligently to resolve this dispute without resorting to the WTO.! However,
consent from member states of the EU, which presently insist on no changes
to the de facto ban, seems unlikely.9 With the potential for an additional two
years of waiting before the possible introduction of new genetically modified
foods (GMFs) to the European market and the imminent additional damages
the US agricultural industry will suffer as a result of lost exports, adjudication
before a WTO Dispute Panel seems to be the last alternative available for the
US. As the convening of such a panel is all but inevitable, this Comment will
analyze the legal issues and challenges associated with this dispute through a
hypothetical panel report that may likely resemble the ultimate decision of this
case, if ever adjudicated. Part I of the report will analyze the conflict through
the background of GMFs and their positive and negative uses, as well as
legislation controlling such products in the EU and US, while Part II will set
forth the applicable law found within WTO treaties and other international
conventions. Part III will apply this law to the facts of the case through an
analysis of the competing precautionary principle and scientific approach, and
Part IV will set forth the likely ruling of the panel. Finally, this Comment will
conclude with a call for the EU to conciliate and resolve this dispute before
this matter is brought before a WTO Dispute Panel.
4 See Warning that a Continuation of the Moratorium on Biotech Crops Could Escalate
into a Serious Trade Dispute, THE FOOD INSTITUTE REPORT, Dec. 24,2001, available at 2001
WL 30429769.
See id.; Geitner, supra note 3.
6 See id.
See Europe's Ties With America: New Causefor Concern, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug.
16,2001, available at 2001 WL 4857462 (citing European disapproval of US President George
Bush's handling of issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the possibility of a post-Cold
War decoupling of the US from the EU, as causes for concerns over the state of the alliance).
See also Irwin M. Stelzer, Is Europe a Threat?, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1,2001, available at 2001
WL 25550690.
' See Lambrecht, supra note 2.
9 See Geitner, supra note 3.
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EUROPEAN UNION-DE FACTO MORATORIUM ON THE APPROVAL OF NEW
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOT PRODUCTS HYPOTHETICAL REPORT OF THE
PANEL"0
INTRODUCTION
The United States requested consultations with the European Union
pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes" and Article XXII: I of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 2 (GATT) regarding the de facto ban imposed upon
importation of certain genetically modified products by the European Union.
I. BACKGROUND
In what represents perhaps one of the most polarized and contentious
debate in international politics, the ongoing scientific and political dialogue
over the safety and benefits of GMOs and GMFs finds its essence within
national and cultural differences. 3 Although little evidence exists demonstrat-
ing these products are dangerous to humans or the environment, and the
National Academy of Sciences recently reported that it could find no existing
evidence of crops and food products manufactured with GMO technology
posing a threat to humans via consumption, 4 multifaceted controversies still
surround the assessment of the risks and benefits of GMOs and GMFs.
Supporters argue such products are as safe, if not safer, than foods on the
10 For posterity, the author desires to warn any reader of this Comment of the possibility this
case may be decided at the time of one's reading, likely causing much of this argument to be a
mute point. This is a hypothetical analysis of what the author believes the decision will be, not
what such a decision is.
" Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Art. 4,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. After the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the GATT organization became the World Trade
Organization [WTO] on January 1, 1995. Final Act, supra note 11. For purposes of this
Comment, all references to GATI 1947 and GATr 1994 are recognized as GATT.
13 See Dan Ferber, Food Fight: Risks and Benefits: GM Crops in the Cross Hairs, 286 Sci.
1662, 1662 (1999).
"' See Committee on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants, National Research
Council, Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation (2000), available
at http://www.nap.edulbooks/0309069300.html. In addition, the report sets forward
recommendations for further study as to environmental impact. See id.
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market not making use of such technology, while opponents counter with
general themes arising out of a need to proceed with such technology with
caution and care. While GMFs are commonplace and widely accepted in the
United States, widespread European disfavor with such foods arises out of
previous encounters with food contamination and fears of relapses caused by
these so-called "Frankenstein" foods.'5 This section reviews the arguments for
and against the use and consumption of GMFs.
A. The Origin of the GMO Issue Before the WTO Dispute Panel
The subject of this proceeding before a WTO Dispute Panel involves the
de facto failure of the EU to authorize any new genetically modified food
product since March of 1998.16 Responding to growing concerns over
potential health problems associated with imported food, largely driven by
outbreaks of "mad cow disease," the foot and mouth disease crises, and other
"bad food" phenomenon associated with food cultivation and consumption, the
European Union opted to suspend approvals under Directive 90/2207 of
certain genetically modified crops.'" In May of 1999, relying upon a study
indicating that pollen from a bioengineered form of corn, bacillus thuringeinsis
(Bt), posed a potential threat to monarch butterflies, the European Commission
froze the approval process for hybrid seeds of this genetically modified
product, in spite of previous approval by EU scientists and findings that such
seeds presented no threat to human health or the environment.' 9 Soon
thereafter, the European Council of Environment Ministers ruled out the
approval of any GMO applications until revisions were made to Directive
90/220, approved by the European Parliament and implemented among the
Member States.20 The non-retroactive effect of the ban allows for GMO
products approved before 1998 to remain in the European market; however,
the restriction on the approval of new products over the past four years,
"5 See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Europe Plans Advisory Unit on Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2000, at A16.
" See Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47, 79-
81(2001).
'7 See discussion of Directive 90/220, infra pp. 13-14.
" See Rick Weiss, In Europe, Cuisine du Gene Gets a Vehement Thumbs Down, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 1999, at Al.
1" See Commission to Halt Approval Processfor Bt Maize Seed in Light of New Study, 22
INT'L ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 436, 436 (1999).
20 See EU Environment Ministers Strengthen De Facto Ban on GMOs; WTO Fight Looms,
22 INT'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) 567, 568 (1999).
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coupled with the suspension of certain genetically modified corn products,
continues to impair the United States agricultural sector, the world's largest
exporter of GMO products. Lost corn exports alone resulted in about $600
million in damages to US farmers.2
B. Defining Biotechnology
In the same way the benefits and dangers of GMO products and GMFs are
subject to much debate, such remains true in arriving at a consensus on a
definition of "biotechnology."22 Traditional agricultural modification of
microorganisms dates back centuries and includes the production of products
such as beer, wine, and bread, where through fermentation, the harnessing of
organisms such as enzymes catalyze chemical reactions.2 However, the
modem debate stems from the new form of biotechnology, which allows
scientists to fuse genes on a cellular level, rather than organismal2 The
scientific community generally characterizes modem agricultural biotechnol-
ogy or GM technology as using recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid ('rDNA')
methods to alter plant characteristics through a variety of methods of inserting
genes from one organism to another.25 Utilization of agricultural biotechnol-
ogy results in plants characterized as GMOs, which can be processed further
to make other foods.26  GMFs include the foods derived using GMOs,
including both the GMO and foods resulting from further processing. 7
Examples of well known GMOs include the FlavrSavmrM tomato, which
21 See Lambrecht, supra note 2.
By 1993, forty-one different definitions of biotechnology coexisted amongst numerous
European Community documents. See Lois LEMKOW, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO GENETIC
ENGINEERING: SoM:E EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 9 (1993). See also Jeffrey K. Francer, Note,
Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology in the United
States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257, 261 (2001).
' See id. at 261-62. Other forms of traditional biotechnology include selective breeding
procedures creating novel plants and animals. See id.
24 See id.
' See Denise M. Lietz, Comment, A Precautionary Tale: The International Trade
Implications ofRegulating Genetically Modified Foods in Australia and New Zealand, 10 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 411, 413-14 (2001). See generally ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC
BASKET: THE POTENTIAL AND HAZARDs OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2000); MARC VAN
MOTAGU, PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, IN BIOTECH., PATENTS & MORALITY 57 (Sigid Sterck ed., 1997).
26 See Lietz, supra note 25, at 414; MCHUGHEN, supra note 25, at 9.
27 See id. at 11-12; Lietz, supra note 25, at 414.
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maintains a longer shelf-life from a GM gene, and Bt corn, modified with a
Bacillus thuringiensis gene that produces a protein toxic to some insects."8
Varying definitions of biotechnology exist amongst the United States and
European Union, largely resulting from the varying scientific evidence/risk
assessment method and precautionary approaches utilized by these respective
parties. In the US, applying the scientific evidence/risk assessment method,
the Food and Drug Administration defines genetic modification as involving
"the alteration of a plant using any technique, new or traditional."29 Con-
versely, representing the precautionary approach, the EU maintains a distinct
category of agricultural products, namely "novel foods," which includes
"foods and food ingredients containing or consisting of genetically modified
organisms, foods and food ingredients produced from but not containing
genetically modified organisms and certain foods and food ingredients from
a production process not currently used, among other possibilities."3 For
purposes of this analysis, biotechnology will be defined as the process used "to
isolate genes from an organism, manipulate them in the laboratory and inject
them into another organism."'"
1. Benefits of GMOs
Supporters of GMOs and biotechnology assert several benefits arising from
their use serving both environmental and economical means. Of primary
importance, proponents base their arguments on the efficiency and productiv-
ity inherent in the transfer of favorable characteristics into new plants.32
Through higher food production per acre of farmland, proponents believe
GMOs will enable farmers to feed a growing population while the reducing
"ecological space" farmlands occupy on scarce arable land.33 In addition,
GMO supporters argue biotechnological engineering will lower the levels of
28 See Lietz, supra note 25, at 414; MCHUGHEN, supra note 25, at 108.
9 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, Food and Drug
Administration, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, at n.3 (1992).
30 European Parliament/Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1, at 2-3.
31 Biotechnology, Agriculture and Food, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), at 211 (1992), in George C. York, Note, GlobalFoods, Local Tastes and
Biotechnology: The New Legal Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 423, 426 (2001).
2 See ROBERT B. HORSCH, Biotechnology and Sustainable Development, in BIOTECHNOL-
OGY AND BIOSAFETY: PROCEEDINGS OF AN ASSOCIATED EVENT OF THE FIFrH ANNUAL WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 25




agro-chemicals used on farmlands given genetic modification's capacity to
implant pest resistance genes into many types of crops."' Essential benefits
may be derived from these limits on pesticide use, namely the mitigation of
undesirable environmental damage caused by such products, as well as a
conservation of natural resources utilized in such activities, such as fossil fuels
necessary for farm equipment operation. 5
In addition to environmental and economic benefits, GMOs are believed to
offer varying health benefits through enriched food profiles and improved
pharmaceutical development. Certain GMFs contain vaccines for diseases,
enhanced vitamins and minerals, and less fatty acids.36 Specific GMFs with
enhanced health benefits include: (1) golden rice, enriched with beta-carotene
to prevent blindness and increase disease resistance;37 amplified bananas with
the Hepatitis B vaccine, which cuts price per dosage from $125.00 to $0.10,
and avoids refrigeration, transportation and sterilization costs;38 and, (3) wheat
and peanuts that no longer contain allergenic properties. 9
2. Potential Risks of GMOs
Contrasting the miraculous advancements promised by proponents of the
use of agricultural biotechnology, opponents cite several threats associated
with GMOs that merit further scientific investigation. For starters, genetic
modification may potentially transfer genes through a natural process of
hybridization from pesticide-resistant crops to other wild or semi-domesticate
relatives, spurring the creation of uncontrollable "superweeds."' In addition,
34 See LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., VITAL SIGNS 2000 16 (2000).
35 See id.
See York, supra note 31, at 430.
s See Madeline Nash, Grains of Hope: Genetically Engineered Crops Could Revolutionize
Farming. Protesters Fear They CouldAlso Destroy the Ecosystem. You Decide, TIME, July 31,
2000, at 39, in York, supra note 31, at 430.
"' See Council For Biotechnology Information (CBI), available at www.whybiotech.com/en/
benefits/nutrition/con63.aspMD-40, in York, supra note 31, at 430.
"' See CDI, supra note 32, in York, supra note 31, at 430. For a more thorough description
of the benefits of GMOs and GMFs, see id. See also Frankenstein foods: Genetically modified
foods can delivergreat benefits. It would be wrong to slow theirdevelopment, ECONOMIST, Feb.
20, 1999, at 17, available at 1999 WL 7361862.
40 See MIGUEL A. ALTERI. The Environmental Risks of Transgenic Crops: An
Agroecological Assessment, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOSAFETY: PROCEEDINGS OF AN
ASSOCIATED EVENT OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTALLY
AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 33 (Ismail Serageldin &Wanda Collins eds. 1999).
Cf Frankenstein Foods, supra note 39 (arguing that if GMOs are bad for the environment, such
harm is likely of a similar to the way normal agriculture harms the environment).
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opponents attempt to undermine the benefit of pesticide reduction, citing the
potential for insect pests to develop immunities to crops with engineered
toxins.4' Evidence supporting such an argument arises from laboratory and
field tests where insects targeted by the toxins of Bt com developed a
resistance.' Further, concerns exist over threats posed to beneficial insects,
such as the Monarch butterfly,"3 as well as the potential harm in human
consumption, specifically relating to allergenic reactions and long-term toxic
effects, which fuel the oppositions cry for further research, testing the
environmental and consumption impact of GMOs and GMFs."
Accompanying scientific and environmental arguments against the use of
biotechnology, additional ethical and social concerns highlight the debate. For
example, some opponents argue that all technology is unnatural and unaccept-
able, while others express concerns over the inclusion of animal genes in
GMOs and GMFs, leading to disparities in moral and religious beliefs. 4" In
addition, GMO technology domination by large corporations raises fears that
the realization of profits will result in legitimate risks being ignored,' as well
as a general perception that existing regulatory agencies provide no meaning-
ful oversight for biotechnology and food development."7
41 See ALTERI, supra note 40, at 34.
42 See id.
41 See Ferber, supra note 13, at 1663-65. In one study, scientists reported that Bt. corn
adversely affected Monarch butterflies, causing caterpillars to eat less, grow more slowly, and
suffer a higher mortality rate than larvae reared on leaves dusted with corn pollen from non-
genetically modified com. See John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae,
399 NATURE 214 (May 20, 1999). CfAMENDED REVISED RESPONSE TO EPA'S DATA CALL-IN
NOTICE CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF BT CORN ON NON-TARGET
LEPIDOPTERANS (2001), available at www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs
Executive%20summary%20and20%preface.pdf.
44 See Ferber, supra note 13, at 1665. Cf AMENDED REVISED RESPONSE TO EPA'S DATA
CALL-IN NOTICE CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF BT CORN ON NON-TARGET
LEPIDOPTERANS (2001), available at www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs/
Executive%2Osummary%20and2Opreface.pdf.
' Donna U. Vogt & Mickey Parish, CRS Report to Congress: Food Biotechnology in the
United States: Science, Regulation, and Issues (1999), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
typical/globallbiotech/crsfood.htm.
"See EU-US BIOTECHNOLOGY CONSULTATIVE FORUM, THE US-EU CONSULTATIVE FORUM
FINAL REPORT 5 (Dec. 2000).
47 See id. at 8. For a more thorough discussion of the threats of biotechnology, see York,
supra note 31, at 432; Lietz, supra note 25, at 415-16.
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C. Domestic US-EU Regulations of GMOs
1. United States Regulatory Scheme
No major statutes in the United States specifically address biotechnology.
The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology provides the
foundation for the general regulation of GMOs, asserting that foods and drugs
derived through the use of modern biotechnology are to be regulated under the
same statutory framework as similar products utilizing related techniques."'
This framework establishes several general principles: regulation of
biotechnology by existing federal law; 9 final product regulation of goods
produced through biotechnology, as opposed to regulation of the process
employed to produce the goods;"0 case-by-case determination of the safety of
biotech products;"' and, coordination among all government agencies involved
in biotech regulation." Thus, a fragmented process exists for the approval of
biotech products involving three departments exercising jurisdiction over
specific matters: the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
a. FDA: Foods Derived Through Biotechnology
Under the authority of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA),-3 the FDA maintains the responsibility to ensure the safety of most
foods, including GMOs and GMFs.5' Generally speaking, the FDA regulates
GMOs in the same way as traditional food products derived from normal
breeding techniques.55 Although new additives in foods must be demonstrated
safe before marketing, companies producing foods through biotech means
need not obtain FDA approval to introduce such foods to the US market, as US
and FDA policy recognize that such foods are like conventional foods and,






13 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
54 See id.
" See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,984 (1994).
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thus, generally safe. 6 While companies are given the option to consult with
the FDA prior to marketing, companies customarily request such pre-
marketing consultations." In the event the product raises health concerns
during these consultations, the FFDCA empowers the FDA to require a pre-
market review." Companies carry the legal obligation of ensuring the safety
of foods placed into the market.5 9 The FDA possesses significant powers of
enforcement in this regard, namely the capacity to cease distribution of unsafe
food products,' as well as subject companies introducing unsafe foods in the
market to criminal prosecution.' In essence, the US system places the burden
on the producer to assure food safety.62
b. EPA: GMOs and Pesticides
The FFDCA and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodentcide Act
(FIFRA)63 charge the EPA with approving pesticides derived from biotechnol-
ogy and bioengineered plants, in particular, plants engineered with Bacillus
thuringiensis." Under FIFRA, prior to market introduction, companies must
register pesticides with the EPA.65 Through the FFDCA, the EPA establishes
maximum tolerance levels for pesticide residues in foods." In addition, the
EPA regulates the manufacturing and importation of new microorganisms,
including intergeneric organisms procured through biotechnology, through
notification procedures under the Toxic Substances Control Act.67
c. USDA: GMOs as Plant Pests
Through the Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the
USDA regulates GMOs in so far as they qualify as plant pests." Producers of
56 See id.
17 See id. at 22,989.
s See id. at 22,988.
'9 See 21 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1) (1994).
60 See 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,988.
61 See id.
62 See id. For amore thorough analysis of FDA involvement in the regulation of GMOs, see
Francer, supra note 22, at 267-275.
63 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -13 6y (1994).
" See id.; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395.
65 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.
" See 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 23,005.
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(d).
69 See T. MORATH, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. REGULATION OF
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new GMO plants must demonstrate through field trials via a petition to APHIS
that the plant is safe and poses no significant risks as a plant pest.69 Charged
with the task of conducting an environmental assessment to ascertain the
GMO's potential effects on human and animal health, APHIS may deem the
status of the new plant as non-regulated, whereby the GMO is no longer
subject to APHIS' plant regulation rules.7" Since 1992, thirty-six GM plants
received APHIS approval through non-regulated status.7 Given the increasing
number of field test performed annually, analysts expect a rapid and signifi-
cant increase in the number of approved plants. 2
d. U.S. Labeling Policy
Supporting the US belief that agricultural products enhanced through
biotechnology do not significantly differ from their traditional counterparts,
no general requirement exists for the labeling of agricultural products derived
from or containing GMOs. Though some circumstances may call for labeling,
such as when the GMF differs considerably from its conventional counterpart,
e.g. containing a certain allergen not commonly found within the normal food
product, labeling would likely be required to warn consumers of potential
these potential threats." In fact, labeling of GMFs may be an unconstitutional
violation of free speech in the US, as demonstrated in a 1994 Vermont case
challenging a law requiring the labeling of milk and milk products derived
from cattle treated with recombinant bovine somatotropin.74
2. European Union Regulatory Scheme
Standing in sharp contrast to the bifurcated, final product focus of United
States regulation of biotechnology and GMO products, the European Union
PRODuCTs DERIVED FROM BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (1998). APHIS derives its authority to regulate
plant pest under the Federal Plant Pest Act and the Plant Qurantine Act. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 50aa-
150lj (1994); 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1994).
69 See id. at 5.
70 See id. at 1.
7' See id. at 4.
72 See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S.D.A., Crop Lines No Longer
Regulated by USDA, at http://www.aphis.usda.dov/biotech/noLreg.html.
See 57 Fed. Reg. 22, 984, 22,991.
7' See International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F.Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1995) (holding
that the labeling statute would probably be held unconstitutional given the state of Vermont's
failure to show "cognizable harm" and that the First Amendment protects the rights of
companies "not to speak.").
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maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework designed to ensure the
protection of human health and the subsistence of a single European market
for biotechnological products. Through an evolving approach reflecting the
diversity of political views and historical attitudes towards food alteration
technology, the EU provides for a dual approach to biotech regulation, namely
pre-marketing safety assessments and a "one stop" clearance procedure. By
focusing on the process employed to derive these products, the EU regulatory
scheme highlights significant differences from the product rather than process
design of US regulation. The fundamental issues addressed in EU GMO
legislation include:
1. Regulation of the contained use of GMOs;
2. Authorization of deliberate releases of GMOs into the
environment via field-testing and commercial growing;
3. Authorization for market inclusion of GMOs and GMO
products;
4. Labeling of GMOs and GMO products."
This section will analyze the four essential components of the EU system,
including: Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release of GMOs
into the environment;7 6 Regulation No. 258/97, the Novel Foods Regulation;"7
Commission Directive 97/35/EC, amending Directive 90/220/EEC, to require
the labeling of products containing GM~s; 8 and Council Regulation No.
1139/98, regarding the compulsory indication of the labeling of certain
foodstuffs produced from GMOs.79 Proposed legislation regarding additional
labeling requirements will also be discussed.
"' See Ruth MacKenzie & Sylvia Franceson, The Regulation of Genetically Modifled Foods
in the European Union: An Overview, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 530, 534-35 (2000).
76 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the Deliberate Release into the
Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, 1990 03. (L 117) [hereinafter Deliberate
Release Directive].
" Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) [hereinafter Novel Foods Regulation].
71 Commission Directive 97/35/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 169).
' Council Regulation (EC) No. 1139/98 of 26 May 1998, Concerning the Compulsory
Indication of the Labelling of Certain Foodstuffs Produced From Genetically Modified




a. Council Directive 90/220/EEC." Deliberate Release Directive
Establishing the centerpiece of EU GMO legislation, the Deliberate Release
Directive establishes a mandatory pre-market approval for GMOs 8 Seeking
to provide "a high level of protection throughout the Community" for health,
safety, and environmental protection, the Directive seeks to approximate the
laws of the EU member states regarding GMOs intended for environmental
release." Prior to market introduction of a GMO for commercial use in any
part of the EU, notification must be sent to the competent member state
authority where the GMO will be released. 2 Notification must include a risk
assessment with information necessary for evaluating the foreseeable risks
posed by the GMO to human health or the environment, to which the
competent authority will evaluate and provide written consent as a prerequisite
release. 3 In addition, a "Proposal for Labeling and Packaging" must
accompany the notification.8 Competent authorities than forward to the
Commission summaries of each notification, which are forwarded to other
member states, followed by a decision from the competent authority on the
compliance of the GMO with the Deliberate Release Directive."
The process continues through a series of notifications and opportunities
for objections from the competent authorities of other member states,
channeled through the Commission.86 In cases of successful applications, the
Commission adopts the measures, whereas noncomplying proposals are
forwarded to the Council for decision. GMOs approved by either the
Commission or Council may be used without prohibition, restriction, or
impediment in any member state. 8 However, in the event a member state
so See Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 1.
" See id.
82 See id. art. 11(1).
83 See id. The directive provides a lengthy list of required notification data, including:
characteristics of the donor, recipient, or parent organism; potential for cross-organism transfer
of genetic information; pathogenicity; antibiotic resistance; and allergencity. See id. at Annex
I. See also Commission Directive 94/15, 1994 O.J. (L. 103) 20 (providing subsequent enhanced
notification requirements).
u See Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 11.
SS See id. art. 12(1-2). Release requires written consent from the Commission and all other
member states. See id. art. 11(5).
'6 See id. art. 13.
17 See id. art. 21.
"8 See Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 15. The procedure for release of GMO products
for research purposes is quite similar to that of the process for GMO released for commercial
purposes. See id. art. 5-9.
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finds that an approved GMO "constitutes a risk to human health and/or the
environment," provisional marketing restrictions may be imposed. 9 Such
restrictions are subject to review by the Commission.'
b. Council Regulation 258/97: Novel Foods Regulation
Aimed at providing a uniform law for new foods throughout the member
states, the Novel Foods Regulation applies to foods "which have not hitherto
been used for human consumption to a significant degrees within the
community.""' These novel foods include GMO products within the meaning
of the Direct Release Directive, foods produced by though not containing
GMOs, and foods "with a new or intentionally modified primary molecular
structure." Through an approval procedure similar to that of the Direct
Release Directive, the Novel Foods Regulation focus of this legislation
requires the submission of a proposed label for the product, including
information as to how the product's characteristics differ from existing foods. 93
Scientific assessment determines the novelty of the proposed food by
comparing its equivalence to existing products, calculated to ultimately
disclose through labels to consumers purchasing the product as to whether
GMOs are present or may be present in the food.9' The Regulation details
procedures for food assessment, the role of the Commission in the authoriza-
tion process, and the institution of provisional restrictions similar to the
Deliberate Release Directive for member states believing that a novel food
poses a threat to human health or the environment. 9'
'9 See id. art. 15. For further discussion regarding Council Directive 90/220, see Mackenzie,
supra note 75, at 535-43.
'o See id.
"' See Commission Regulation No. 258/97 art. 1(2).
9 See id. art. 1.
'" See id. art. 6(1), 8(l)(a).
94 See id. art. 8(1), 8(l)(d).
9' See id. art. 12-13. The implementation of Directive 90/220 and Regulation 25 8/97 present
the EU with significant challenges, namely the failure to provide uniform EU-wide labeling
standards, the lack of harmonization in the notification and approval procedure requirements
throughout the EU, resulting trade tensions between the US and EU over bulk food shipments,
and a seemingly arbitrary de minimis threshold for labeling GMOs. For a thorough discussion
of these issues, see Francer, supra note 22, at 286-90.
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c. Commission Directive 97/35/EC
Commission Directive 97/35/EC essentially amends Annex III of the
Deliberate Release Directive, placing additional requirements on labeling for
products containing or made from GMOs." Essentially, a label or accompany-
ing document must be included on products approved under Directive 90/220
indicating whether the product consists of GMOs, and the possibility that
GMOs may be present within the product.97 Though placing stricter labeling
requirements on new GMOs, the amendment does not require segregation of
GMO and non-GMO products.
d. Council Regulation No. 1139/1998
In an effort to encompass certain GM products not affected by the Novel
Foods Regulation, given its non-retroactivity, such as GM soybeans and GM
maize authorized under the Deliberate Release Directive, Council Regulation
1139/1998 attempts to apply uniform labeling requirements among the
member states for such products. Arising out of concerns over diverging
labeling requirements in the member states affecting the free movement of
goods throughout the community, the Council saw necessary to "ensure the
final consumer is informed of any characteristic or food property... which
renders a food no longer equivalent to an existing food or food ingredient."98
Foods made of and produced from GM soybeans and GM maize constituted
no exception, and thus were made subject to these labeling requirements."
e. Subsequent Legislative Attempts
Important legislative attempts by the European Union reflect the trends
underlying the previously described regulations, namely the strengthening of
existing regulation to stringently monitor the approval and release of GMO
products and an effort to disclose to the consumers the content of foods
containing such GMO products. Recent draft legislation from July of 2001
proposed by the Commission to further regulate the marketing of such food
products and to establish a reliable system of identification and labeling of
9 See Commission Directive 97/35.
97 See id.98 See id. pmbl., para 4, 9.
99 See id. par 9.
2002] 489
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
GMOs is being pushed through the legislative process.'0 Although the
Commission contends such legislation, as well as the enforcement of other
labeling requirements initiated since the passing of Directive 90/220, remains
consistent with international trade obligations and other biotechnology
agreements, the likelihood of increased conflicts among trading partners
steadily grows and will likely spur further action before the WTO.'0°
II. CONTROLLING LAW
A. GA T/WTO Treaty Law
As Member States of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
and the incorporating body of the World Trade Organization, the United States
and the European Union are subject to the restrictions of the GATT Agreement
and other WTO agreements. In essence, the GATr/WTO system seeks to
eliminate nontariff barriers to free trade while gradually decreasing tariff
barriers and abolishing all forms of discriminatory treatment in international
trade)0 2 However, such measures remain subject to the need to "protect and
preserve the environment."'0 3 Practically speaking, the issue submitted in this
case revolves around this increasingly complicated paradigm: the promotion
of free and open trade and the necessity for environmental protection. The
following will set out appropriate sections of related WTO agreements and
describe the applicability of each to the pervading issue.
1. GAYTArticle"
Effectuating the WTO's concern for protecting the environment in the
international arena and the interests of Member States in the preservation of
"0 See Laurent Zecchini, Brussels Wants to ResumeMarketing While Protecting Consumers,
WORLD NEwS CONNECTION, July 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25736344.
,01 While other issues surrounding the EU-US GMO conflict exist, the scope of this paper
is limited to the potentially existing conflict over the de facto moratorium impairing the approval
of new foods produced through genetic modification and the resulting trade conflict between the
US and the EU over this moratorium. For further information on other issues generally involved
in the US-EU GMO conflict, see David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue
Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2001).
'2 GATT pmbl., supra note 12. WTO Agreement preamble, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex I A, Legal Instruments-Results of the




the environment domestically, article XX of the GATT allows for the
implementation of domestic legislation that "sidestep the normal trading rules"
of the GATT/WTO "if necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."'" The latitude afforded to Member States remains subject to article
XX's chapeau, which prohibits measures constituting a means of:
[1] arbitrary or
[2] unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or
[3] a disguised restriction on international trade. 105
Relevant to the present dispute is the third prong of the chapeau and the
EU's use of the de facto ban on new US imports of GMO food products.
Whether such actions run afoul of this rule and effectively constitute disguised
restrictions on trade remains the ultimate question of this dispute. As the EU
bears a shifted burden under this section to prove these actions are in fact
necessary for the protection of "human, animal or plant life or health," the US
must first demonstrate this ban represents a disguised restriction on trade. The
fact should be noted that standard practice by the WTO Dispute Panel stands
to weigh the benefit the EU gains from this ban of US imports against the
burden such ban places on the international trading system, as opposed to
weighing the benefit to the environment against the burden on the US.' 6 In
addition, the US burden of showing the ban on new GMO products must
overcome the principle of previous GATT decisions, namely the interpretation
that publication of restrictive measures is enough to ensure that such measures
are not to be considered as a "disguised restriction. ' '0 7
'0' HAKAN, NORDSTROM & SCOTT VAUGHAN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 9 (World Trade
Organization Special Studies 4, 1999).
'o5 GATT art. XX, supra note 12. See Brandon L. Bowen, Note, The World Trade
Organization and Its Interpretation oftheArticleXX Exceptions to theAgreementon Tariffs and
Trade, in Light of Recent Developments, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMT. L. 181 (2000); Phil Bentley
Q.C., Essay, A Re-Assessment ofArticle XX, Paragraphs (B) and (G) of GA 7T 1994 in the Light
of Growing Consumer and Environmental Concern About Biotechnology, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L. J. 107 (2000); Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GA7T Article XX Chapeau: A
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739 (2001).
" See generally WTO Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (93-3 899) (Oct. 12,1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Sea Turtle
Appellate Report].
'a' See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, BISD 30S/107, 125 § 54 (May 26, 1983). See also GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX:
GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 520 (6th ed. 1994); INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE
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2. WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement)
composes the primary legal instrument for addressing biotechnology in the
WTO forum,. ' Above all, the SPS Agreement is a trade agreement, not a
health agreement, targeting specifically the overuse of national health
regulation. Broadly speaking, SPS rules apply only to sanitary and
phytosanitary measures defined in the agreement, which for present purposes
include laws aimed to protect against pest exposure, disease-carrying
organisms, disease-causing organisms, disease-carrying plants, and to laws
restricting additives, contaminants, and toxins in food and feedstuffs.' 9
Applying to "all sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which may, directly or
indirectly, affect international trade,"" " the SPS agreement recognizes the right
of Member States to enforce such measures that are necessary for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, which must be based on
scientific principles and not without sufficient scientific evidence. "' Previous
WTO Appellate Body decisions interpret this provision as requiring "a rational
or objective relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific
evidence."' 2 As established under GATr art. XX, measures not meeting this
criteria may constitute disguised restrictions on international trade.'
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement seeks to harmonize sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, mandating Member States to base such measures on
international standards, guidelines or recommendations."4  Measures
consistent with such international criteria are deemed consistent with the need
GATT/WTO DisPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 334 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
'08 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [hereinafter
SPS Agreement], WTO Agreement, supra note 97. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving
International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81 (2000); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
in the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. &POL.
865 (2000).
o See id. at Annex 1.
"1o Id. art. 1(1).
"' Id. art. 2(l) and 2(2).
112 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, AB- 1998-
8, WT/DS76/AB/R at para. 84 (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan Agriculture], available at
http://www.wto.org/dispute/distab.htn. Presumably, "sound science" is a requirement, though
this term is absent from the SPS Agreement. Such an omission makes the Agreement unclear
as to the level of discretion maintained by the Dispute Panel in evaluating scientific findings
submitted by Member States. As of yet, this question remains undetermined by any WTO Panel.
113 SPS Agreement, supra note 103, art. 2(3).
"1 Id. art. 3(1).
[Vol. 30:475
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and, thus, consistent with
GATT article XX 5  Measures resulting in higher levels of sanitary or
phytosanitary protections may be utilized under the auspices of scientific
justification or risk assessment considerations enumerated under article 516
Perhaps the most essential aspect of the SPS Agreement relevant to this
matter may be found in article 5's requirement for a risk assessment."
7
Working in tandem with article 3's scientific evidence requirement, article 5
requires Member States to ensure measures affected by the agreement to be
"based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to
human, animal or plant life or health."'" Risk assessment may either be "the
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or
disease ... or the evaluation of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs."" 9 In undertaking a risk
assessment, Member States must rely on factors such as "available scientific
evidence, relevant processes and production methods; ... [and] relevant
ecological and environmental conditions."'20
Of further relevance to this matter, article 5 requires Member States to
ensure measures under this agreement "are not more trade-restrictive than
required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.''
Essentially, the EU ban on new US GMO products must not be deemed to be
overly excessive in the EU's desire to protect life and health, which requires
an examination of alternative, less restrictive practices that may effectively
provide the same level of protection without the current level of restriction.
In addition, article 5(7) makes allowances for circumstances where relevant
scientific evidence is insufficient.'2 In such a situation, SPS measures may be
adopted by a Member State based on available information, including pertinent
data from measures applied by other Member States or from relevant
international organizations.' Such measures remain subject, however, to
I d. art. 3(2).
16 Id. art. 3(3).
"7 Id. art. S.
"' Id. art. 5(1).
"' See SPS Agreement, supra note 103, at Annex A, para. 4.
12o Id. art. 5(2).
n, Id. art. 5(6).
'" Id. art. 5(7).
' See id.
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future objective risk assessment to be made within a reasonable period of
time. 1
24
The recognition of the scientific evidence and risk assessment principle
comprises the essential importance of the SPS Agreement relevant to the US-
EU GMO dispute. As described through articles 2 and 5, measures taken by
a Member State must be substantiated and justified through evidence that such
regulations serve to protect life and health from impending harm caused by the
object the measure seeks to prohibit. In this case, in order to justify its de
facto ban on the importation of new GMO products from the United States
consistent with the SPS Agreement, the EU must offer scientific evidence and
a viable risk assessment that GMO products constitute a threat to life and
health, and that such a ban effectively serves as a minimum obstacle to prevent
the impending harm caused by such products.'25
B. The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol
Expanding upon the United Nations' framework for addressing concerns
over transboundary movement of GMO arising out of the use of biotechnol-
ogy, the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol 26 (BSP) to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) 2 7 attempts to establish an international system for
the management of GMO products. Through the establishment of a clearing-
house for the exchange of information relating to biotechnology and regula-
tions requiring agreement and consent before movement of bioengineered
products may proceed, the BSP sets forth a legally binding means to address
trade risks associated with biotechnology. Of important consideration to this
WTO Panel, both the United States and European Union remain presently
bound under the BSP though the agreement has yet to go into effect. 28
The most relevant aspect of the BSP for purposes of this analysis may be
found in the Protocol's incorporation of the precautionary principle throughout
the document. Under the auspices of the basic premise that when a threat of
serious or irreversible harm exists, even in the absence of clear evidence of
124 See id.
" For an in depth analysis of the SPS Agreement, see Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision
of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 271 (2000).
'" See Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29,2000,39 I.L.M. 1027, reprinted in 23 Int'l
Envtl Rep. (BNA) No. 3 (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter BSP].
17 See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD].
128 However, it should be noted threats are being made by the Bush Administration that the
US may choose to withdraw from the BSP. See John Nichols, Bush on Wrong Side of Food
Labeling, CAPITAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 2001, at 6A, available at 2001 WL 25524206.
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harm or risk, the precautionary principal allows states to take precautions to
protect health and the environment, regardless of costs.'29 Standing in sharp
contrast to the scientific evidence/risk assessment approach established within
the SPS Agreement, the precautionary principal effectively allows states to act
on the basis of concern over certainty. This principle permeates throughout
the BSP, arising in five places: (1) the preamble, "reaffirming the precaution-
ary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development";' 30 article 1, declaring the objective of the treaty to be
interpreted according to the "precautionary principle"; 3' article 10, dealing
with the decision making procedures for introducing GMOs to the environ-
ment; 3 2 article 11, concerning biotech products "intended for use as food or
feed, or for processing";'33 and Annex II, expanding on the elements on an
article 15 risk assessment.'34 Of a noteworthy matter is the fact that although
the BSP incorporates the precautionary principle, risks assessments based on
scientific evidence must also be taken before a state may bar any biotech
product, though such a state may act to restrict the product in absence of
scientific evidence contrary to or in support of the state's position. 3
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Though the facts and circumstances surrounding the matter of the EU de
facto ban on new US GMO foods present a set of complicated and uncertain
problems, the essential legal issue of this case converges on the two conflicting
principles found within WTO law and the Biosafety Protocol, namely risk
assessment/scientific evidence v. the precautionary principle. As argued by
the European Union, the de facto ban remains justified under GATI article XX
and the precautionary principle of the BSP given the fact that scientific
uncertainty precludes a full and thorough assessment of the risks posed by
GMO foods, thus justifying the EU's chosen level through the ban of human,
animal, and plant life and health. 36 In contrast, the United States asserts the
29 See Caroline Tinker, Is a United Nations Convention the Most Appropriate Means to
Pursue the Goal of Biological Diversity?: Responsibilityfor Biological Diversity Conservation
Under International Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 793-94 (1995).
30 BSP, supra note 122, at pmbl.
3 id. art. I.
232 See id. art. 10.
23 Id. art. 11.
134 See id. Annex II.
"' See id. art. 15 and art. 16.
236 See Communication on the Precautionary Principle, Communication from the
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position that the de facto ban violates the chapeau of GATT article XX,
constituting a disguised restriction on international trade illegal under the
GATT. Specifically, the EU leaves unfulfilled the mandate of the SPS
agreement to justify the ban through a risk assessment/scientific evidence
analysis. In effect, both parties remain correct upon their assertions, based on
the legal principles offered by each. However, one legal principle must trump
the other in this case, hence the following section will analyze the applicability
of the risk assessment/scientific analysis approach in contrast with the
precautionary principle.
A. WTO Adjudication and the SPS Agreement
Widely heralded as the preeminent interpretation of the SPS Agreement,
the 1998 WTO Appellate Body decision on European Community Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 37 provides an acceptable,
though not binding, starting point for understanding the role of the precaution-
ary principal and the risk assessment/scientific evidence approach in
international trade law."' In a case similar to the matter at hand, the United
States and Canada challenged a ban instituted by the European Union on the
importation of beef injected with or fed one of six growth hormones. "9 Ruling
against the EU's ban, the Appellate Body asserted two key points relevant to
this analysis:
It is "less than clear" that the Precautionary Principle is a
principle of general or customary international law, and
cannot, in any case, override any provisions of the SPSAgreement. '40
Commission of the European Communities, COM(2000)1 final (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter EC
Communication], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/health-consumer/precaution.htm.
Several U.S. agencies criticized the Commission's definition of the precautionary principle as
being "enshrined" in various international conventions. See Standards: Wallsrom Rejects US.
Charge that Paper Fails to Define EU 'Precautionary Principle,' 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
570, Apr. 6, 2000.
'37 See European Community Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (World Trade Organization Appellate Body,
Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormones].
"a Note that decisions of WTO Dispute Panels and Appellate Bodies are not considered
binding precedent, though may be referenced, as is customary, for precedential value in
subsequent cases.
139 See id.
" See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade in Living Modified Organisms: The New
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A WTO member exercising its right under Article 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement to set its own level of SPS protection must
have "sufficient scientific evidence" gathered as a result of a
"risk assessment" required under SPS Article 5.141
The implications of this ruling for the EU in this case supports the US's
argument against allowing the EU to justify the ban based on the precautionary
principle. In the principle's stead, the Beef Hormones case requires a showing
that the new GMO foods affected by the de facto ban are in fact dangerous to
human, plant, or animal life and health, substantiated by convincing scientific
evidence. In fact, no sufficient amount of such evidence exists, consequently
prohibiting the EU from offering such evidence in this case.
Additional WTO Appellate Body decisions provide insight as to the
functioning of the SPS Agreement. In a matter likewise similar to the present
EU case, the Appellate Body ruled against an Australian ban on fresh, chilled,
and frozen salmon that violated the SPS Agreement. 4 1 Of particular
importance, the Appellate Body found that an adequate risk assessment under
article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement required an identification of "the diseases
whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to prevent within its
territory, as well as the potential biological and economic consequence
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases," coupled
with an evaluation of "the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these
diseases according to the SPS measures which might be applied."' 43 In
addition, given the lack of adequate scientific evidence and a sufficient risk
assessment supporting the Australian ban on ocean-caught salmon in spite of
allowing the importation of other disease susceptible fish, the Appellate Body
ruled that the measures violated article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, constituting
an arbitrary, unjustifiable, and disguised restriction on international trade.'"
A similar conclusion spurred from a subsequent case involving a Japanese ban
on certain US agricultural products (Japanese Agriculture),' 4 resulting in the
holding that such bans must be accompanied by scientific justification,
Regimes, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 856, 859 (2000).
141 See id. (citing Beef Hormones, supra note 132, at para. 177).
1'2 See Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. WTIDS 1 8/AB/R
(World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, Nov. 6, 1998).
141 Id. paras. 128-38.
'" See id. paras. 141-78.
15 See Japan Agriculture, supra note 112.
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consisting of "a rational relationship between the SPS measure at issue and the
available scientific evidence."'"
The holdings in the Beef Hormones, Australian Salmon, and Japanese
Agriculture disputes represent significant obstacles for the EC's de facto ban
in this case. Specifically, under these decisions, the de facto ban instituted by
the EU prohibiting the approval and importation of new GMO products from
the US must be accompanied by and justifiable through scientific evidence
consisting of an adequate risk assessment identifying the risks associated with
these new GMO products and evaluating the likelihood of actual effectuation
of such risks. Further, these cases support the contention that the precaution-
ary principle does not play a superior role to the scientific evidence/risk
assessment approach mandated by the SPS Agreement; thus, the EU cannot
make use of this principle alone to justify the ban. As asserted in these cases,
if the EU cannot make a showing supporting the ban through the requisite
scientific evidence, the ban must constitute an arbitrary, unjustifiable, and
disguised impediment to international trade that must be removed.
Though previous WTO rulings on the SPS Agreement seem to point
conclusively against the EU ban in this case, the issue remains as to what role,
if any, the Biosafety Protocol may play in substantiating the EU's position.
The following section will analyze this matter, as well as the relationship
between the BSP and the SPS Agreement.
B. The Precautionary Principle in International Law and the BSP
Mentioned sparsely in the international arena, miscellaneous non-binding
declarations, 4 7 the Rio Declaration of 1992,4" and the Biosafety Protocol
composes international law's primary embodiment of the precautionary
" Kevin Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the
WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81, 98 (2000).
'41 See Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of
the North Sea (Nov. 1987), at http://odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declaration/london/html;
Ministerial Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea
(Mar. 1990), at http://odin.no/md/html/conf/declaration/hague.html. See also G.A. Res. 37/7,
U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 21, at (I)(21) U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/7 (1982) (citing the
precautionary principal for the first time in the so-called World Charter for Nature).
'" See Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR
A/CONF.125/126 (1992). Article 15 of the Rio Declaration states: "In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach should be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific




principal."49 The BSP's incorporation of the principal remains particularly
important in this analysis given US and EU participation in the agreement, as
well as the SPS Agreement's affirmation of an entirely inconsistent approach
under the scientific evidence/risk assessment analysis.' Thus, the conflict of
the BSP and SPS Agreement must be examined.
The matter of treaty subrogation plays a particularly important role in the
outcome of this case. The Preamble of the BSP asserts two conflicting
statements:
1. The BSP "shall not be interpreted as implying a change to
the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing
international agreements;" and
2. The first statement "is not intended to subordinate this
Protocol to other international agreements."''
What does this mean? These inconsistent statements seemingly cancel each
other, as how would it be possible for US and EU obligations under the SPS
agreement, mandating a scientific certainty/risk assessment approach, which
shall nor be changed in light of the BSP as stated in the first preposition,
remain consistent with their respective mandate to make use of the precaution-
ary principal of the BSP given the second statement's attempt to insure the
BSP remains equally regarded with other international agreements, including
the SPS Agreement.' According to article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the
context, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. '3 Accord-
ingly, the likely conclusion stands that the precautionary principal in the BSP
supplements the scientific evidence/risk assessment decree of the SPS
Agreement. 54 In effect, "this interpretation is the only one that gives
maximum effect to both the BSP and SPS agreements so that neither cancels
each other out."'55 However, such cannot be the case as the equal treatment of
"4 See BSP, supra note 122, art. 11(8).
IS0 See generally Gretchen L. Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety Protocol and the
World Trade Organization: Can the Two Coexist? 12. 107 (2000).
' See BSP, supra note 122, at prmbl.
152 See Schoenbaum, supra note 140, at 864.
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679.
" See Schoenbaum, supra note 140, at 865.
155 Id.
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the WTO SPS Agreement and the BSP stands in the face of WTO Dispute
Panel and Appellate Body adjudication. Such opposes the reasoning of Beef
Hormones, Australia Salmon, and Japanese Agriculture, effectively
"overruling" these decisions and yielding the result that bans on the importa-
tion of certain foods based on insufficient scientific evidence may be
maintained if a risk assessment is carried out utilizing available scientific
evidence and areas of scientific uncertainty are identified and addressed. 56
The SPS Agreement neither intends nor contemplates such a result, nor do any
other agreements of the WTO. Uniformity and harmonization of trade remains
the paramount and fundamental objective of the WTO, thus, adherence to
subsequent agreements by some Member States in lieu of an unvaried and
consorted association by all WTO Member States cannot stand. Hence, in
absence of other internationally binding obligations, and based on numerous
decision made by the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO, the SPS
Agreement and the risk assessment/scientific evidence analysis contained
therein effectively trumps the precautionary principal of the BSP given the
inconsistent outcome of their application." 7
In fact, the precautionary principal maintains no legal standing in the
international arena aside from the binding agreements mandating such an
analysis that do not conflict with WTO law. Accordingly, the precautionary
principle neither constitutes a general principle of international law, nor can
it be considered as customary international law. In the context of the former,
the International Court of Justice Statute under article 38(1)(c) requires general
principles of international law to be derived from the municipal laws of
different legal systems.' Although EU attempts to recognize the precaution-
ary principle as a "general" principle of community law, as well as "a full-
fledged and general principle of international, 159 exist, the limited usage of the
principle prohibits the full recognition of the principle as a general principle
of international law. The matter of customary international law remains much
1S6 See id.
'17 See also Hans-Joachim Priess & Christian Pistchas, Protection of Public Health and the
Role of the Precautionary Principle Under WTO Law: A Trojan Horse Before Geneva's Walls?
24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 519 (2000) (arguing that it is not possible to rely on the precautionary
principle in an attempt to override or modify the obligations stemming from WTO agreements).
258 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(IXc), 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
"59 EC Communication on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 136, at para. 3-4. The
validity of this statement remains demoralized by the European Council's more conservative
assessment of the precautionary principle as on which is "gradually asserting itself as a principle
of international law in the fields of environmental and health protection." Id. para. 3.
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clearer, as customary international law may only be established through actual
state behavior coupled with the belief that such behavior is legally required-
opinojuris.'6° The process for a principal to become customary international
law, as recognized by the International Court of Justice, requires:
1. A fundamentally norm-creating character of the principal;
2. Widespread and representative participation in the
convention in question; and,
3. State practice.6
While fulfillment of the first two criteria may be questionable, widespread
state practice remains unmistakably unfulfilled, verified even by the European
Commission who did not even attempt to assert the conditions were met in its
recent 2000 Communication on the Precautionary Principal.'
In absence of international legal recognition, the precautionary principle
cannot supersede the scientific certainty/risk assessment approach of the SPS
Agreement. Given the respective forum adjudicating this matter and the
existence of numerous decisions by dispute settlement panels of the WTO, the
SPS Agreement is deemed to overrule any inconsistencies found within other
international agreements in conflict, which in this case pertains to the BSP's
recognition of the precautionary principle. Hence, the controlling standard for
the decision of this matter is the scientific certainty/risk assessment analysis
and the de facto ban maintained by the European Union must meet such
standards in order to be found legal under WTO law.
IV. HYPOTHETICAL RuLING
Based on the preeminence of the SPS Agreement and the scientific
evidence/risk assessment analysis mandated therein, the European Union's de
facto ban on new United States GMO products constitutes an arbitrary,
unjustifiable, and disguised restriction on international trade. The absence of
a scientific certainty based on a proper risk assessment demonstrating the risks
associated with these particular GMO agricultural products and an evaluation
of the probability and likelihood of damage to human, animal, plant life or
health causes the ban to suspiciously cultivate a disguised barrier to free trade
for the benefit of farmers within the EU and to the detriment of their American
" See ICJ Statute, supra note 158, art. 38(1)(b).
161 See id.
"' See generally EC Communication on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 136.
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counterparts. If sufficient scientific certainty existed, or comes to exist in the
future, the ban of GMO foods could likely be maintained. However, the EU
must derive a fundamental understanding from this ruling that until the
precautionary principal becomes a general or customary principle of
international law, or is incorporated into the law of the World Trade Organiza-
tion through future agreements and negotiations, future uses of this principle,
whether it be in the area of further bans on GMOs or required labeling of
GMO products, will almost certainly meet a similar judgment by a WTO
adjudication panel. Hence, the EU is hereby ordered to reinstate the use of the
approval process for GMO agricultural products and effectively lift the de
facto ban that remains in place. Likewise, damages in the amount of lost US
exports resulting from the ban shall be paid by the EU to the US.
CONCLUSION
As represented by the hypothetical holding and reasoning of this fictitious
WTO Dispute Panel decision, if the EU persists in maintaining the four year
old de facto ban of US GMO agricultural products, the EU will likely lose in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The precautionary principle the EU
seeks to hang its case upon will not overrule or supplement the scientific
certainty/risk assessment of the SPS Agreement, thus leaving the EU with little
to nothing to augment its claim that GMO products pose a risk to human,
animal, or plant life and health.
In the event a WTO Dispute Panel follows the reasoning utilized in
previous WTO decisions and rules against the EU over its de facto ban of US
food products, the result will likely bring about numerous ramifications. First
of all, contemporary EU moves towards a uniform labeling requirement that
will single-out GMO products by requiring a label designating the product as
such will likely also be found to constitute a disguised restriction on trade.,"
163 A recent EU proposal published on July 25, 2001 targets the re-enforcement of GMO
labeling requirements, which the Commission defends as aiming to allow consumers "to make
an informed choice." See Biotechnology: Commission Defends GMO Labeling Proposal,
European Report, Sept. 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26061581. In response, calls for
challenges are already being made by the US agricultural industry, citing the profound
ramifications such measures will have on US food and commodity industries the "the potential
that these proposals will form the basis for similar initiatives elsewhere." See Stephen Clapp,
US. Industry May Oppose EU Biotech Legislation, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Aug. 6, 2001,
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Perhaps a more rational and less controversial approach to EU labeling
concerns may be to institute a inverted requirement, specifically a labeling
system where the food would be designated as a "Non-GMO." Such practices
remain in affect in the United States, yielding ludicrous profit margins for
foods that can claim to be "organic" and "natural." In essence, a ruling against
the EU on the current ban will likely spill over into the next contentious issue,
which in this case will almost certainly be GMO labeling, and in the same
manner Beef Hormones establishes loosely based precedential value in the
biotechnology trade arena, the EU may be peering down a long and winless
trek in the WTO adjudication system.
In addition, the likely and impending peril of the EU over the de facto
GMO ban may be equally menacing in many other ways. As illustrated by the
EU's failure to comply with the 1998 WTO Appellate Body's order for the
removal of the ban on beef hormone products and opting to pay money
damages, the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system may be
jeopardized should the EU continue this developing pattern in the case of a
negative ruling over the GMO agricultural ban.'" Further, already strained
US-EU relations will likely suffer further drawbacks, potentially sparking a
much feared trade war between the world's largest trading partners. The
occurrence of either of these events would be devastating to the WTO and the
world trading system as a whole and should be avoided at all costs.
In many ways, the impending dispute between the EU and US over
biotechnology represents the epic legal conflict of imposing strict, objective
criteria without practically being able to factor subjective implications and
societal concerns into the judgment. However, the beauty of this particular
paradigm will become increasingly evident as elementary market forces work
to rectify this problem through consumer discrimination. If genetically
modified foods are unsuccessful in the European market, the result will be
attributable to consumer activity arising out of health and scientific concerns
over food safety, not discriminatory government regulation designed to
interfere with market forces. Disclosure and dissimulation of information
remain essential for market efficiency, and such objectives may be adequately
addressed and accomplished through a optional labeling regime of non-GMO
foods. Rather than inhibit market efficiency by limiting consumer food
options through de facto moratoriums and mandatory labeling requirements,
available at 2001 WL 12773695.
'" See generally Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Note, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World
Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve
Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133 (2001).
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which essentially deter and restrict diversification among imports from
producers in the US and other states, consumers will be given numerous
options and allowed to subjectively determine the success or failure of GMO
foods in the European Market. Indeed, this laissez-faire approach will serve
both US and EU concerns by allowing the economic free hand to ultimately
resolve the GMO food dispute.
As former US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes brilliantly
observed, great cases sometimes make bad law. As the negative implications
of the adjudication of this dispute over the EU's de facto ban of new US
agricultural products are evident, the US and EU must conciliate further to
develop a compromise before resorting to the WTO. However, until the EU
can offer substantiated evidence of risks to human, animal, or plant life and
health posed by the GMO foods affected by the de facto ban, the United States
will maintain the dominate hand and ultimately decide the dispute's final
outcome. As the old saying states, if it looks like a duck and walks like a
duck, it probably is a duck. Likewise, the ban maintained by the EU certainly
looks like an arbitrary, unjustifiable, and disguised restriction on trade, but the
questions remains: does the world really need the WTO to make this clear?
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